

XERO COPY

XERO COPY

XERO COPY

XERO COPY

XERO COPY

XERO COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

DDI-288368

12:2 OCT 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

SUBJECT : Planning for [redacted] Photographic
Satellite System

1. During 1967 COMIREX undertook an exhaustive study of the possible need to apply satellite photography to the problems of early warning and indications. One of the most important findings of the study was that a reconnaissance capability to meet the needs for early warning could also make a major contribution to other surveillance requirements without detracting from its capability to do the indications task.

2. Early this year USIB requested NRO to review the COMIREX study and assess the feasibility of creating such a capability. Although the Director, NRO has not responded formally, the NRO Staff has passed a draft of its study to the COMIREX Staff informally. On the basis of this, it appears that an operational reconnaissance satellite system with [redacted] readout appears feasible within three to five years after a decision to proceed has been made. Dr. Flax is in the process of formulating his personal views on the trade-offs between the time and costs involved in acquiring such a capability.

3. I raise this matter at this time for two reasons. First, [redacted] reconnaissance satellite is bound to have a tremendous impact on the way we do business in terms of organization, procedures, facilities, and equipment. Second, our preferences with respect to procedures and organization could in turn have

BYE 1420-68

Copy No. 9Handle via BYEMAN
Control System~~TOP SECRET~~

XERO
COPYXERO
COPYXERO
COPYXERO
COPY~~TOP SECRET~~XERO
COPYHandle via BYEMAN
Control SystemXERO
COPY

significant effects on the technical decisions that will be made by NRO within the next year or two. I believe these two factors make it necessary for us to study these problems now and to begin the financial and personnel planning required.

4. Clearly, this is a community problem which the USIB will eventually turn over to COMIREX. Because of the Agency's role in NPIC, I recommend that we take the lead in this matter by establishing a task force to study the problem, determine the CIA position, and guide the later COMIREX deliberations. I propose that you set up a task force with representation from the DDI, DDS&T, and CIA personnel on the COMIREX Staff. It may be desirable to have it chaired by someone from OPPB, but I would like to discuss this with you before you take action.

/s/ R. J. Smith

R. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence

EWProctor:fbr (21 October 1968)

Distribution:

- Copies 1-3 - Executive Director w/copy 3 for OPPB
- 4 - C/IRS
- 5 - DD/OSR
- 6 - COMIREX
- 7 - Executive Director/NPIC
- 8 - DDS&T
- 9 - ODDI Chrono
- 10 - ADDI Chrono
- 11 - ODDI COMIREX File

BYE 1420-68

-2-

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTROL NO. _____

REFERRED TO OFFICE	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY	
	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	NAME & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE

Handle Via Indicated Controls

BYEMAN

Access to this document will be restricted to those persons
cleared for the specific projects;

.....

.....

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to BYEMAN Control System.

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification